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// hl:crypto — passwords first. JS transpiler twin of plugins/crypto/crypto.zig.//// Parity contract with the native plugin:// hash(password, options) → a PHC string, freshly salted every call// verify(password, stored) → boolean, timing-safe comparison// parsePhc(stored) → the stored string described, or null// kdf() → the algorithm THIS engine hashes with// sha256(data) → 64 lowercase hex characters// randomBytes(n, encoding) → "hex" (default) or "base64"// toBase64(data) → base64 of a String's UTF-8 or of a Bytes (ticket #90)// fromBase64(text) → a Bytes, or null when text is not base64//// The PHC STRING FORMAT, the strictness of the parser, the cost knob and its cap,// and the salt/output lengths are identical on both engines — a `$scrypt$` string// written by either one verifies on the other, byte for byte, because RFC 7914 is// RFC 7914 whether it is reached through Node's crypto or through libcrypto's// EVP_PBE_scrypt.//// THE ONE DIFFERENCE, stated rather than hidden: Node has no argon2 of any kind,// so this engine hashes with scrypt where the native plugin prefers argon2id on a// host whose libcrypto has it. `parsePhc` still reads argon2id strings here — the// format is just a string — but `verify` on one THROWS instead of answering// `false`, because "I cannot compute this algorithm" is not "wrong password".import { createHash, randomBytes as nodeRandomBytes, scryptSync, timingSafeEqual } from 'node:crypto';// Bytes are the runtime's: this file is copied to hl-modules/crypto.js, beside hl-runtime.js.import { hlMakeBytes, hlIsBytes } from '../hl-runtime.js';// The cost knob: base-2 log of the working memory in KiB. Same numbers as the// native plugin — 15 is 32 MiB (scrypt N = 2^15, r = 8, p = 1 is 128·N·r bytes).const COST_DEFAULT = 15;const COST_MIN = 10; // 1 MiBconst COST_MAX = 17; // 128 MiB — see the note in crypto.zig; the two engines// must cap at the same number or a string one of them// wrote would be out of range for the other.const SALT_LEN = 16;const HASH_LEN = 32;// The floor a stored string must clear to be READ at all — see decodePhc().const MIN_SALT_LEN = 8;const MIN_HASH_LEN = 16;const SCRYPT_R = 8;const SCRYPT_P = 1;// Node refuses a derivation whose 128·N·r exceeds maxmem, default 32 MiB — which// the DEFAULT cost sits exactly on. Raised past the cost cap so the cap is the// only thing that limits anything.const SCRYPT_MAXMEM = 2 * 1024 * 1024 * 1024;const B64_CHARS = /^[A-Za-z0-9+/]+$/;function b64(buf) {return buf.toString('base64').replace(/=+$/, '');}// Deliberately strict, to match the Zig decoder, and BOTH halves of that are// load-bearing:// • Node's base64 reader silently skips characters outside the alphabet, so a// string with junk in it would parse rather than be refused;// • it also drops NON-CANONICAL TRAILING BITS. A 32-byte hash is 43 base64// characters, whose last character carries only two significant bits — so// "…L8E" and "…L8F" decode to the SAME 32 bytes and, before this check,// editing the last character of a stored hash did not change what it// verified against. Zig's decoder refuses that outright; re-encoding is how// this engine reaches the same answer.function unb64(text) {if (!B64_CHARS.test(text)) return null;const buf = Buffer.from(text, 'base64');if (buf.length === 0) return null;if (b64(buf) !== text) return null;return buf;}function paramValue(field, key) {for (const pair of field.split(',')) {const eq = pair.indexOf('=');if (eq < 0) continue;if (pair.slice(0, eq) !== key) continue;const raw = pair.slice(eq + 1);if (!/^[0-9]+$/.test(raw)) return null;const n = Number(raw);return Number.isSafeInteger(n) ? n : null;}return null;}/** Strict PHC decode. Any deviation at all is null — that is what makes a* tampered string fail rather than half-parse into something comparable.** Including the LENGTH FLOOR: a KDF derives as many bytes as it is asked for,* so a stored string whose hash field had been cut down to eight base64* characters derived six bytes and compared six bytes — and six bytes of a* correct derivation match. Truncating the stored value was a way to make a* wrong password verify until this check existed (both engines had it). */function decodePhc(stored) {if (typeof stored !== 'string' || stored.length < 2 || stored[0] !== '$') return null;const parts = stored.slice(1).split('$');if (parts.length > 8) return null;if (parts[0] === 'argon2id') {if (parts.length !== 5) return null;if (!parts[1].startsWith('v=') || !/^[0-9]+$/.test(parts[1].slice(2))) return null;const version = Number(parts[1].slice(2));const m = paramValue(parts[2], 'm');const t = paramValue(parts[2], 't');const p = paramValue(parts[2], 'p');if (m === null || t === null || p === null) return null;const salt = unb64(parts[3]);const hash = unb64(parts[4]);if (!salt || !hash) return null;if (salt.length < MIN_SALT_LEN || hash.length < MIN_HASH_LEN) return null;return { kdf: 'argon2id', version, m, t, p, salt, hash };}if (parts[0] === 'scrypt') {if (parts.length !== 4) return null;const ln = paramValue(parts[1], 'ln');const r = paramValue(parts[1], 'r');const p = paramValue(parts[1], 'p');if (ln === null || r === null || p === null) return null;const salt = unb64(parts[2]);const hash = unb64(parts[3]);if (!salt || !hash) return null;if (salt.length < MIN_SALT_LEN || hash.length < MIN_HASH_LEN) return null;return { kdf: 'scrypt', version: null, ln, r, p, salt, hash };}return null;}function clampCost(value) {if (typeof value !== 'number' || Number.isNaN(value)) return COST_DEFAULT;return Math.trunc(Math.max(COST_MIN, Math.min(COST_MAX, value)));}export function hash(password, options) {if (typeof password !== 'string') throw new Error('hl:crypto hash() expects a string password');const opts = options && typeof options === 'object' ? options : {};const cost = clampCost(opts.cost);const want = typeof opts.kdf === 'string' ? opts.kdf : 'scrypt';if (want === 'argon2id') {throw new Error('hl:crypto hash(): this engine has no argon2id — Node ships no argon2');}if (want !== 'scrypt') {throw new Error('hl:crypto hash(): unknown kdf — expected "argon2id" or "scrypt"');}const salt = nodeRandomBytes(SALT_LEN);const derived = scryptSync(password, salt, HASH_LEN, {N: 2 ** cost, r: SCRYPT_R, p: SCRYPT_P, maxmem: SCRYPT_MAXMEM,});return `$scrypt$ln=${cost},r=${SCRYPT_R},p=${SCRYPT_P}$${b64(salt)}$${b64(derived)}`;}export function verify(password, stored) {if (typeof password !== 'string') return false;const phc = decodePhc(stored);if (phc === null) return false;if (phc.hash.length === 0 || phc.hash.length > 64) return false;if (phc.kdf === 'argon2id') {throw new Error('hl:crypto verify(): stored password is argon2id and this engine has none — Node ships no argon2');}if (phc.ln === 0 || phc.ln > 30 || phc.r === 0 || phc.p === 0) return false;let computed;try {computed = scryptSync(password, phc.salt, phc.hash.length, {N: 2 ** phc.ln, r: phc.r, p: phc.p, maxmem: SCRYPT_MAXMEM,});} catch {// A stored string asking for more memory than this host will give is not a// wrong password, but it is also not something to crash a login over.return false;}return timingSafeEqual(computed, phc.hash);}export function parsePhc(stored) {const phc = decodePhc(stored);if (phc === null) return null;const params = phc.kdf === 'argon2id'? { m: phc.m, t: phc.t, p: phc.p }: { ln: phc.ln, r: phc.r, p: phc.p };return {kdf: phc.kdf,version: phc.version,params,saltLen: phc.salt.length,hashLen: phc.hash.length,};}export function kdf() {return 'scrypt';}export function sha256(data) {if (typeof data !== 'string') throw new Error('hl:crypto sha256() expects a string');return createHash('sha256').update(data, 'utf8').digest('hex');}export function randomBytes(n, encoding) {if (typeof n !== 'number' || !(n >= 1) || n > 1024) {throw new Error('hl:crypto randomBytes(): count must be between 1 and 1024');}const buf = nodeRandomBytes(Math.trunc(n));const enc = typeof encoding === 'string' ? encoding : 'hex';if (enc === 'hex') return buf.toString('hex');if (enc === 'base64') return buf.toString('base64');throw new Error('hl:crypto randomBytes(): encoding must be "hex" or "base64"');}// Base64, standard alphabet (ticket #90) — the rules are crypto.zig's: encoding// pads; decoding takes padded or unpadded text and answers null for anything an// encoder would not have written. Node's own decoder skips what it does not// understand, so the text is checked first and the result re-encoded after.export function toBase64(data) {if (hlIsBytes(data)) return Buffer.from(data._d).toString('base64');if (typeof data !== 'string') throw new Error('hl:crypto toBase64() expects a String or a Bytes');return Buffer.from(data, 'utf8').toString('base64');}export function fromBase64(text) {if (typeof text !== 'string') throw new Error('hl:crypto fromBase64() expects a String');let core = text;if (core.length % 4 === 0) core = core.replace(/={1,2}$/, '');if (core.length % 4 === 1 || !/^[A-Za-z0-9+/]*$/.test(core)) return null;const buf = Buffer.from(core, 'base64');if (buf.toString('base64').replace(/=+$/, '') !== core) return null;return hlMakeBytes(new Uint8Array(buf));}
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- 3dea0ef2notes: Hybriel master 190aa11d (fc838894 GC correctness, #126 closure scopes, #127); gate 50/0mre
- e27c7d71notes: Hybriel master 8efba065 (#126 GC by bytes, #48 lambda params copy; audit: nothing to fix; gate 50/0)mre
- 124613b6antcolony#40: mission references point to the moved missionsmre
- 1ca2f34dantcolony#40: history (LOG.md), worker briefs (missions/) and reports moved here from antcolony, numbered per project; old numbers in antcolony docs/mission-map.mdmre
- 2bebebdanotes: Hybriel master ff51cf46 (re-vendor round)mre
- 3eff126dnotes#3: installable app (manifest + own icon/favicon; notes' own sw.js kept)mre
- 9883c540deploy.sh: back up live storage/.sessions/.env before every deploy (newest 5 kept)mre
- eee693b8deploy.sh: never send .git or .gitignore to Byrodinmre
- c8904061State of 2026-09-27, before the move to gitoriamre